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Abstract
In this survey, we provide a selective review of the literature on ination, in-
novation and economic growth. The relationship between economic growth and
ination is a fundamental question in economics. Most studies in this literature
explore this relationship in capital-based growth models. This survey reviews a
recent branch of this literature on ination and innovation-driven growth. Specif-
ically, we use a canonical monetary Schumpeterian growth model to demonstrate
the e¤ects of ination on innovation and the macroeconomy via di¤erent chan-
nels. We nd that the cash-in-advance constraints on consumption and R&D
investment have drastically di¤erent implications on the macroeconomic e¤ects
of ination.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between economic growth and ination has been a fundamental ques-
tion in economics since the seminal study by Tobin (1965). There is now a well estab-
lished literature that explores this question in capital-based growth models; see Gillman
and Kejak (2005) for an excellent survey of this literature. However, the seminal study
by Solow (1956) provides an important insight that in the long run, economic growth is
driven by technological progress. Therefore, to fully capture the long-run relationship
between ination and economic growth, we need to also explore the e¤ects of ination
on economic growth via innovation.
This survey provides a selective review of the literature on ination and innovation-
driven growth. This literature is based on the literature on innovation and economic
growth. In this literature, the seminal study is Romer (1990), who develops the rst
R&D-based growth model in which innovation is due to new products. Aghion and
Howitt (1992) develop the Schumpeterian growth model in which innovation is due to
quality improvement; see also Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom et al.
(1990) for other early studies. In this survey, we use a canonical monetary Schum-
peterian growth model to demonstrate the e¤ects of ination on innovation and eco-
nomic growth.
The seminal study in this literature is Marquis and Re¤ett (1994), who introduce
a transaction-service sector and a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on consumption
to the Romer model. They nd that an increase in the ination rate gives rise to a
reallocation of factor input from R&D and production to transaction services. The
decrease in factor input in R&D in turn reduces economic growth. Furthermore, the
Friedman rule (i.e., a zero nominal interest rate) is optimal in Marquis and Re¤ett
(1994) because the Romer model with only positive R&D externalities always features
R&D underinvestment. As a result, a nominal interest rate that is above zero is
suboptimal by depressing R&D investment in the economy.
Surprisingly, it wasnt until the early 2010s, the relationship between ination and
innovation-driven growth started to receive attention again. Funk and Kromen (2010)
introduce sticky prices to a Schumpeterian growth model to examine the e¤ects of in-
ation on economic growth. They nd that under exible prices, money is superneutral
(i.e., changes in the ination rate have no e¤ect on economic growth). Therefore, they
require sticky prices in order for ination to a¤ect economic growth in the short run.
However, Chu and Lai (2013) show that the Schumpeterian growth model with exible
prices can feature a non-neutral relationship between ination and economic growth
even in the long run. Both Funk and Kromen (2010) and Chu and Lai (2013) con-
sider a Schumpeterian growth model with elastic labor supply and a money-in-utility
specication. The crucial di¤erence is that Chu and Lai (2013) allow for a non-unitary
elasticity of substitution between the real money balance and consumption, whereas
Funk and Kromen (2010) focus on a unitary elasticity of substitution. Chu and Lai
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(2013) nd that if the elasticity of substitution between the real money balance and
consumption is less than unity, then an increase in ination decreases R&D, economic
growth and social welfare. They also provide empirical evidence for a negative rela-
tionship between ination and R&D; see also the empirical evidence in Chu, Cozzi, Lai
and Liao (2015).
Chu and Lai (2013) explore the e¤ects of ination via a general-equilibrium chan-
nel, namely the consumption-leisure tradeo¤. However, there is evidence that R&D
investment is subject to liquidity constraints; therefore, Chu and Cozzi (2014) de-
velop a monetary Schumpeterian growth model by formulating a CIA constraint on
R&D investment and explore the e¤ects of monetary policy through this direct chan-
nel. Interestingly, they nd that the Friedman rule can be suboptimal depending on
the underinvestment versus overinvestment of R&D in the Schumpeterian economy.
If the economy exhibits R&D overinvestment (underinvestment), then the Friedman
rule is suboptimal (optimal) because a positive nominal interest rate depresses R&D
and mitigates (worsens) its overinvestment (underinvestment). This result di¤ers from
Marquis and Re¤ett (1994). In the rest of this survey, we use a canonical monetary
Schumpeterian growth model to demonstrate the e¤ects of ination on innovation and
the macroeconomy via di¤erent channels and review recent studies.
The rest of this survey is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the e¤ects of
ination on innovation and economic growth. Section 3 considers monetary policy in
an open economy. Section 4 discusses the e¤ects of ination on other macroeconomic
variables. Section 5 concludes.
2 Ination and innovation-driven growth
In this section, we present a canonical monetary Schumpeterian growth model. The
Schumpeterian growth model originates from Aghion and Howitt (1992). We introduce
money to the model via CIA constraints on consumption and R&D investment as in
Chu and Cozzi (2014).
2.1 Household
The economy features a representative household, which has a lifetime utility function:
U =
Z
1
0
e t lnUtdt =
Z
1
0
e t [ln ct +  ln(L  lt)] dt. (1)
The parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate of the household and the parameter
 > 0 determines the importance of leisure L   lt (relative to consumption ct), where
L is labor endowment and lt is employment at time t.
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The household maximizes utility subject to the accumulation of assets:
_at + _mt = rtat + itbt   tmt + wtlt   ct +  t. (2)
at is the value of real assets (i.e., shares of monopolistic rms), and rt is the real interest
rate. bt is the real value of money lent to R&D entrepreneurs, and it is the nominal
interest rate. mt is the households real money holding, and t is the ination rate.
wt is the real wage rate, and  t is a lump-sum transfer of the seigniorage revenue from
the government. The household also faces the following CIA constraint: bt+ct  mt,
in which  2 [0; 1] is the share of consumption expenditure that is subject to the CIA
constraint and requires the use of money for transaction.
Let t denote the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2). Then, dynamic optimization
yields the intertemporal optimality condition as
 
_t
t
= rt   , (3)
where t is determined in the optimality condition for consumption given by 1=t =
(1 + it)ct. The households supply of labor is given by
lt = L 
(1 + it)ct
wt
. (4)
Furthermore, the Fisher equation it = t + rt holds as a no-arbitrage condition.
2.2 Final good
Final good yt is produced by competitive rms. They use a Cobb-Douglas aggregator
given by
yt = N exp

1
N
Z N
0
ln xt(j)dj

. (5)
There are N di¤erentiated intermediate goods xt(j) for j 2 [0; N ].
1 Let pt(j) denote
the price of xt(j). The prot-maximizing condition for xt(j) is given by
pt(j)xt(j) =
yt
N
, (6)
which is also the conditional demand function for xt(j).
1We include N as a parameter to demonstrate some recent results in the literature.
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2.3 Intermediate goods
Each of the N monopolistic industries is dominated by a temporary industry leader
(who owns the highest-quality product in the industry) until the arrival of the next
innovation. The industry leaders production function for xt(j) in industry j is
xt(j) = z
qt(j)lx;t(j), (7)
where z > 1 is the exogenous step size of quality improvements, qt(j) is the number
of quality improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t, and lx;t(j) is
production labor employed in industry j.
Given the quality level zqt(j), the marginal cost of the leader in industry j is wt=z
qt(j).
From the Bertrand competition between the current industry leader and the previous
industry leader, the prot-maximizing price for the current industry leader is
pt(j) = z
wt
zqt(j)
, (8)
where the quality step size z determines the markup as in Aghion and Howitt (1992)
and Grossman and Helpman (1991).2 The wage payment in industry j is
wtlx;t(j) =
1
z
pt(j)xt(j) =
1
z
yt
N
, (9)
and the monopolistic prot in industry j is
t(j) = pt(j)xt(j)  wtlx;t(j) =
z   1
z
yt
N
, (10)
where the prot margin is (z   1)=z.
2.4 R&D
Given t(j) = t for all j in (10), we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which the
value of inventions is symmetric across industries (i.e., vt(j) = vt for all j); see Cozzi et
al. (2007) for a proof that the symmetric equilibrium is the unique rational-expectation
equilibrium in the Schumpeterian growth model. No arbitrage implies that the value
of an invention vt is determined by
rt =
t + _vt   tvt
vt
, (11)
2One can generalize the model to introduce a markup parameter  that di¤ers from the quality
step size z; see for example, Li (2001) who interprets this parameter  as a patent policy parameter.
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which equates the real interest rate rt to the rate of return on vt. The return on vt is
the sum of monopolistic prot t, capital gain _vt and expected capital loss tvt, where
t is the arrival rate of innovation. When the next quality improvement arrives, the
previous quality improvement becomes obsolete; see Cozzi (2007) for a discussion on
this Arrow replacement e¤ect.
Competitive entrepreneurs perform innovation. They devote lr;t units of labor to
innovation in each industry. The arrival rate of innovation is specied as
t = 'lr;t, (12)
where the parameter ' > 0 determines R&D productivity. Free entry into the R&D
sector implies that
tvt = wtlr;t + itwtlr;t , 'vt = (1 + it)wt, (13)
where  2 [0; 1] is the share of R&D expenditure that is subject to the CIA constraint
and requires money lending from the household.
2.5 Monetary authority
LetMt denote the nominal money supply. Then, the real money balance ismt =Mt=Pt,
where Pt denotes the price level of nal good yt. We consider the nominal interest rate it
as the monetary policy instrument set by the monetary authority. Given an exogenous
i, the ination rate t is endogenous and determined by the Fisher equation:
t = i  rt = i  gt   , (14)
where the second equality uses the consumption growth rate gt  _ct=ct =   _t=t in
(3). Di¤erentiating t with respect to i yields
@t
@i
= 1 
@gt
@i
, (15)
which implies @t=@i > 0 if and only if @gt=@i < 1. A negative e¤ect of the nominal
interest rate on the growth rate would be su¢cient for a positive long-run relationship
between the nominal interest rate it and the ination rate t (i.e., the Fisher e¤ect).
2.6 Innovation and economic growth
The aggregate level of technology is dened as
Zt  exp

1
N
Z N
0
qt(j)dj ln z

= exp
Z t
0
sds ln z

, (16)
6
which uses the law of large numbers and equates the average number of quality im-
provements 1
N
R N
0
qt(j)dj that have occurred as of time t to the average number of
innovation arrivals
R t
0
sds up to time t. We di¤erentiate the log of Zt with respect to
time to derive the growth rate of technology as
_Zt
Zt
= t ln z. (17)
Substituting (7) into (5) yields the aggregate production function given by
yt = N exp

1
N
Z N
0
qt(j)dj ln z +
1
N
Z N
0
ln lx;t(j)dj

= NZtlx;t, (18)
which uses the symmetry condition lx;t(j) = lx;t. Therefore, given a steady-state level
of production labor lx;t = lx per industry, the growth rate of output yt is equal to the
growth rate of technology Zt.
3 We denote this steady-state equilibrium growth rate
as g, which is also the steady-state growth rate of consumption ct. The equilibrium
growth rate g is determined by the arrival rate  of innovation as g =  ln z in (17).
Using (3) in (11), we derive the invention value on the balanced growth path as
vt =
t
+ 
=
1
+ 
z   1
z
yt
N
, (19)
which uses (10). Substituting (9) and (19) into (13) yields an equilibrium condition:
lr =
z   1
1 + i
lx  

'
. (20)
Substituting the resource constraint on labor (lr + lx)N = l into (20) yields the arrival
rate of innovation as
 = 'lr =
1
z + i

' (z   1)
l
N
  (1 + i) 

, (21)
which is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i via the CIA constraint on R&D (i.e.,
 > 0) for a given l. However, the equilibrium level of labor l is still an endogenous
variable (unless  = 0 in which case l = L). To determine l, we use yt = ct, (4), (9)
and (21) to derive
l
N
=
L
N
  z(1 + i)

1+i
z+i


'
1 + z(1 + i)

1+i
z+i
 , (22)
which is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i via both the CIA constraint on
consumption (i.e.,  > 0) and the CIA constraint on R&D (i.e.,  > 0).4
3It can be shown that the economy in this model always jumps to the balanced growth path.
4Recall that z > 1.
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2.7 Discussion
In summary, the CIA constraint  on R&D investment gives rise to a negative e¤ect
of the nominal interest rate i on innovation  via a direct e¤ect on the borrowing
cost of R&D as shown in (21) and an indirect e¤ect through endogenous labor supply
l as shown in (22). In contrast, the CIA constraint  on consumption gives rise to
a negative e¤ect of the nominal interest rate i on innovation  via only the indirect
channel through endogenous labor supply l as shown in (22). In all cases, an increase
in the nominal interest rate i reduces the equilibrium growth rate g =  ln z and raises
the ination rate  (i.e., the Fisher e¤ect) according to (15). Therefore, the monetary
Schumpeterian growth model features a negative relationship between ination and
economic growth. Proposition 1 summarizes this result.
Proposition 1 An increase in the nominal interest rate reduces innovation and eco-
nomic growth in the monetary Schumpeterian growth model, which features a negative
relationship between ination and economic growth.
This result originates from Chu and Cozzi (2014), who use CIA constraints on
consumption and R&D investment to introduce money demand to the Schumpeterian
growth model.5 An earlier study by Chu and Lai (2013) instead uses the following
money-in-utility specication to model money demand:
Ut = [(1  )c
"
t + m
"
t ]
1=" (L  lt)
, (23)
which nests (1) as a special case with  = 0. Here the parameter " 2 ( 1; 1) deter-
mines the elasticity of substitution between consumption ct and the real money balance
mt as 1=(1 ") 2 (0;1). They nd that if the elasticity of substitution is less (greater)
than unity, then an increase in the nominal interest rate sties (stimulates) innovation
and economic growth by reducing (raising) labor supply l. Given an empirically rel-
evant elasticity of substitution being less than unity, a higher nominal interest rate
reduces innovation and economic growth via endogenous labor supply as in the CIA
constraint on consumption.6
Unlike the CIA constraint on R&D investment, both the money-in-utility speci-
cation and the CIA constraint on consumption give rise to a negative relationship
between ination and innovation-driven growth via the consumption-leisure tradeo¤.
Therefore, it is important to examine whether this channel is robust to di¤erent mod-
elling assumptions. Chu and Ji (2016) explore the importance of endogenous market
5They also consider a CIA constraint on manufacturing expenses.
6In the extreme case that consumption ct and the real money balance mt are perfect complements
(i.e., the substitution elasticity 1=(1   ") ! 0), the model yields an equilibrium condition mt =
[(1  )=]ct, which leads to the same results as our CIA constraint on consumption mt = ct.
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structure by introducing money demand via a CIA constraint on consumption to the
second-generation Schumpeterian growth model (which features both quality improve-
ment and new product development) in Peretto (2007). They obtain a novel result
that a higher nominal interest rate decreases economic growth only in the short run
but changes the market structure by decreasing the number of products in the long
run. As a result, the nominal interest rate does not a¤ect the steady-state equilibrium
growth rate when money a¤ects the economy via the CIA constraint on consumption.
To see the intuition of this result, (21) shows that the nominal interest rate af-
fects innovation via the term l=N . In the second-generation Schumpeterian growth
model, the number of products N is endogenous and becomes proportional to labor in
equilibrium such that
N = l; (24)
where  is a composite parameter that is independent of the nominal interest rate.
Substituting (24) into (21) yields
 =
1
z + i

' (z   1)

  (1 + i) 

, (25)
which is now decreasing in the nominal interest rate i only via the CIA constraint on
R&D investment (i.e.,  > 0).
Huang et al. (2020) and Zheng et al. (2020) also consider the second-generation
Schumpeterian growth model and conrm that an increase in the nominal interest rate
has a negative e¤ect on economic growth via the CIA constraint on quality-improving
R&D. Interestingly, they nd that an increase in the nominal interest rate has a pos-
itive e¤ect on economic growth via a CIA constraint on variety-expanding R&D. The
intuition of this result can be seen from (21), which shows that a smaller number of
products N gives rise to a higher growth rate g =  ln z by increasing the amount of
resources for the innovation of each product.7
2.8 Heterogeneous rms
The negative relationship between ination and innovation in Chu and Cozzi (2014)
is consistent with the empirical ndings in Chu and Lai (2013) and Chu, Cozzi, Lai
and Liao (2015). Specically, Chu, Cozzi, Lai and Liao (2015) use cross-country panel
regressions to document a negative relationship between ination and R&D. In a canon-
ical monetary Schumpeterian growth model, this negative relationship between ina-
tion and R&D translates to a negative relationship between ination and economic
growth. However, there is an important stylized fact in the empirical literature that
7One can also think of the composite parameter  in (25) being decreasing in the nominal interest
rate via the CIA constraint on variety-expanding R&D.
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the relationship between ination and economic growth is sometimes inverted-U; see
for example, Bick (2010), Lopez-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) and Chu, Cozzi, Fan,
Furukawa and Liao (2019) for evidence.
To reconcile a negative e¤ect of ination on R&D and an inverted-U e¤ect of ina-
tion on economic growth, Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa and Liao (2017) generalize the model
in Chu and Cozzi (2014) to allow for rm heterogeneity arising from a random step size
of quality improvements, which is based on the Schumpeterian model in Minniti et al.
(2013). Specically, when a higher-quality product is invented, the R&D entrepreneur
draws its quality-improvement step size z > 1 from a Pareto distribution with the
following probability density function:
f(z) =
z (1+)=

, (26)
where  2 (0; 1) is a parameter that determines the shape of the Pareto distribution.
Due to the presence of an entry cost, rms with a very small quality improvement z do
not enter the market because the prot margin (z  1)=z is too low to justify incurring
the entry cost. As a result, the distribution of innovations that are implemented
becomes endogenous. In this case, an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the
entry threshold of the quality step size z by reducing the arrival rate of innovation and
raising the value of inventions.8 Consequently, more innovations are implemented and
give rise to a positive e¤ect of ination on economic growth. Together with its negative
e¤ect on the arrival rate of innovation, the overall relationship between ination and
economic growth becomes inverted-U.
Arawatari et al. (2018) and Hori (2020) also consider rm heterogeneity, and they
focus on heterogeneity in the productivity of R&D entrepreneurs. Arawatari et al.
(2018) show that heterogeneity in R&D productivity gives rise to an interesting non-
linear e¤ect of ination on economic growth. Intuitively, at a high ination rate, a
further increase in ination triggers an occupational change (i.e., some R&D entrepre-
neurs become workers) in their model, which gives rise to a sudden and sharp decrease
in the growth rate. Hori (2020) nds that when R&D entrepreneurs face nancial con-
straints, heterogeneity in R&D productivity also a¤ects optimal monetary policy and
makes the Friedman rule more likely to be suboptimal. Intuitively, although a positive
nominal interest rate reduces the total amount of R&D, it may improve social welfare
by concentrating R&D activities among the more productive entrepreneurs.
2.9 Other general-equilibrium channels
In the literature, recent studies have explored various general-equilibrium channels
that inuence the macroeconomic e¤ects of ination. For example, Chu, Ning and
8For example, vt = t=(+ ) in (19) is decreasing in the arrival rate  of innovation.
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Zhu (2019) introduce endogenous human capital accumulation to a monetary Schum-
peterian growth model and nd that endogenous human capital accumulation amplies
the welfare cost of ination. Chu, Lai and Liao (2019) consider a CIA constraint on
consumption in a hybrid growth model in which innovation and physical capital accu-
mulation are both engines of long-run economic growth. They nd that the market
power of rms can amplify or mitigate the welfare cost of ination depending on the rel-
ative importance of innovation and physical capital accumulation on economic growth.
Gil and Iglesias (2020) also develop a monetary growth model with both innovation and
capital accumulation, and they explore the e¤ects of ination through CIA constraints
on R&D and manufacturing.
He (2018) considers a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous fer-
tility, which features a novel channel through which ination reduces economic growth
via endogenous fertility. He provides empirical evidence that supports this theoretical
result. He et al. (2020) introduce status-seeking preferences to a monetary Schum-
peterian growth model and show that status-seeking preferences give rise to ambigu-
ous e¤ects of ination on economic growth. Specically, when the preference for status
seeking is su¢ciently strong, the e¤ect of ination on economic growth becomes pos-
itive. He and Zou (2016) nd a positive seigniorage e¤ect of monetary expansion on
R&D in a monetary Schumpeterian growth model and provide supportive evidence
based on time-series data in China.
Lin et al. (2020) introduce credit constraints to a monetary Schumpeterian growth
model and derive interesting implications of nancial development on economic growth
and convergence. Mao et al. (2019) model a banking sector, which allows them to
analyze additional monetary policy instruments, such as the required reserve ratio and
the leverage ratio. They explore the e¤ects of these policy instruments on economic
growth and social welfare and nd that banking ine¢ciency can amplify the welfare
cost of ination.
Oikawa and Ueda (2018) introduce sticky prices to a canonical Schumpeterian
growth model via menu costs and model the resulting state-dependent pricing in a
tractable way. They compute the welfare-maximizing and grow-maximizing ination
rates and nd that their di¤erence is determined by the extent of R&D overinvestment
in the economy. Miyakawa, Oikawa and Ueda (2020) introduce sticky prices and menu
costs to the Schumpeterian growth model with heterogeneous multi-product rms de-
veloped by Klette and Kortum (2004) and extended by Lentz and Mortensen (2008)
and nd that the optimal ination rate can be positive by causing quality-superior
rms (i.e., rms with a larger number of products) to grow and quality-inferior rms
to exit. Benigno and Fornaro (2018) consider a Schumpeterian growth model with
sticky wages and show an important result that the economy features a stagnation
trap, in which monetary policy is ine¤ective in stimulating the economy.
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3 Monetary policy in an open economy
All the abovementioned studies focus on a closed economy. Chu, Cozzi, Lai and Liao
(2015) extend the closed-economymodel in Chu and Cozzi (2014) into an open-economy
model with two innovating economies to analyze the cross-country e¤ects of ination on
economic growth and social welfare. They nd that by a¤ecting innovation and tech-
nologies, ination has international spillover e¤ects through trade. Their two-country
model captures these e¤ects as international technology spillovers and international
business stealing. Specically, they use the following Armington aggregator for the
production of a global consumption good Ct that is distributed to households in the
two countries fH;Fg:9
Ct =

(yHt )
( 1)= + (yFt )
( 1)=
=( 1)
, (27)
where yHt and y
F
t denote nal goods produced by country H and country F , respec-
tively. The parameter  > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between yHt and y
F
t .
International technology spillovers arise because innovation in one country benets
households in both countries. International business stealing arises because innovation
in one country allows the country to capture a larger share of the global consumption
market when yHt and y
F
t are gross substitutes (i.e.,  > 1).
Chu, Cozzi, Lai and Liao (2015) nd that these international spillover e¤ects in-
uence the outcome of monetary policy competition across countries. Specically,
the Nash-equilibrium ination rates between the two countries are higher than their
globally optimal ination rates, and the degree of this inationary bias is increasing
(decreasing) in the market power of rms under the CIA constraint on R&D (consump-
tion). They use cross-country panel data to estimate the e¤ects of ination on R&D.
Then, they calibrate moments from their theoretical model to this empirical estimate
and other data in the Euro Area and the US. In summary, they nd a signicant welfare
gain from monetary coordination between the two regions.
Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa and Liao (2019) also consider monetary policy across coun-
tries. However, they explore the cross-country e¤ects of ination in an open econ-
omy with North-South product cycles and international technology transfer via foreign
direct investment (FDI). Their theoretical framework is based on the North-South
Schumpeterian growth model in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010). In this case, the
aggregator for the production of the global consumption good Ct is modied as
Ct =
Z 1
0
[xt(j)]
( 1)= dj
=( 1)
=
Z #t
0
[xt(j)]
( 1)= dj +
Z 1
#t
[xt(j)]
( 1)= dj
=( 1)
,
(28)
9They allow for a weight parameter in the aggregator. Here we simply assume symmetric weight.
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where intermediate goods xt(j) for j 2 [0; #t] are produced in the North and interme-
diate goods xt(j) for j 2 [#t; 1] are produced in the South. The variable #t changes
over time. Specically, multinational rms invest in R&D in the North to improve the
quality of products to be manufactured in the North. Then, they invest in FDI in the
South to transfer production there in order to reduce the production cost. Chu, Cozzi,
Furukawa and Liao (2019) introduce money via CIA constraints on R&D and FDI into
this North-South model to explore the cross-country e¤ects of ination. In summary,
they nd that Southern ination reduces both technology transfer to the South and
innovation in the North, whereas Northern ination reduces innovation in the North
but has ambiguous e¤ects on technology transfer to the South. Calibrating the model
to China-US data and quantifying the cross-country e¤ects of ination, they nd an
asymmetric implication that monetary policy in the US has a signicant e¤ect on the
welfare of households in China, but not vice versa.
To remove the counterfactual scale e¤ect,10 the North-South Schumpeterian growth
model in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) and Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa and Liao (2019)
features semi-endogenous growth, under which monetary policy a¤ects the level of out-
put but not its growth rate in the long run. Chen (2018) converts the semi-endogenous
growth process in Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) to allow for fully endogenous
growth and explores the e¤ects of monetary policy on the long-run growth rate via
the CIA constraints on R&D and FDI as in Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa and Liao (2019).
Most results under semi-endogenous growth without the scale e¤ect are robust to fully
endogenous growth with the scale e¤ect, except that the ambiguous e¤ects of Northern
ination on technology transfer to the South become unambiguously negative.
4 Ination and other macroeconomic variables
In this section, we review the relationship between ination and other macroeconomic
variables in the monetary Schumpeterian growth model. Section 4.1 considers ination
and income inequality. Section 4.2 considers ination and unemployment.
4.1 Ination and income inequality
All the above studies focus on models with a representative household. Therefore,
they could not explore the implications of ination on income inequality. Chu, Cozzi,
Fan, Furukawa and Liao (2019) generalize the monetary Schumpeterian growth model
with random quality improvements in Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa and Liao (2017) to allow
for heterogeneous households in order to explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on
10See Jones (1999) for a discussion on the scale e¤ect in the R&D-based growth model.
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innovation and income inequality. Here household heterogeneity comes from an unequal
distribution of wealth. Given that income inequality is driven by wealth inequality in
this model, the degree of income inequality is increasing in the real interest rate, which
determines asset income. To see this, the level of income received by household h is
It(h)  rtat(h) + itbt(h)  tmt(h) + wtL = rt[at(h) +mt(h)] + wtL, (29)
where we set lt = L and bt(h) = mt(h) (i.e.,  = 0) in (2) for simplicity. Let !t(h) 
at(h)+mt(h) denote the amount of wealth owned by household h. Suppose we consider
two households fh; kg. Then, their income di¤erence is given by
It(h)  It(k) = rt[!t(h)  !t(k)], (30)
which shows that an increase in the real interest rate rt enlarges the income di¤erence
between the two households.11
Recall that ination has an inverted-U e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate g
in Chu, Cozzi, Furukawa and Liao (2017) due to rm heterogeneity that arises from
random quality improvements. This inverted-U e¤ect translates to an inverted-U e¤ect
of ination on the interest rate r = +g and also the degree of income inequality. Chu,
Cozzi, Fan, Furukawa and Liao (2019) use cross-country panel data to estimate the
growth-maximizing ination rate and the inequality-maximizing ination rate. Then,
they calibrate moments from the theoretical model to data in the US and show that
their model can match these empirical estimates.
Zheng et al. (2020) also consider heterogeneous households as in Chu, Cozzi, Fan,
Furukawa and Liao (2019) but in an innovation-driven growth model with sticky prices
and menu costs as in Oikawa and Ueda (2018). In general, their model yields ambiguous
e¤ects of ination on income inequality. According to their preferred set of parameter
values, their simulation yields a negative relationship between ination and inequality.
4.2 Ination and unemployment
All the above studies exhibit full employment. Therefore, they could not explore the
implications of ination on unemployment. Chu, Cozzi, Fan and Furukawa (2020) in-
corporate equilibrium unemployment driven by matching frictions in the labor market
as in Mortensen (2005) into the monetary Schumpeterian growth model. Then, they
use the theoretical framework to explore the long-run relationship between ination
11Chu, Cozzi, Fan, Furukawa and Liao (2019) consider the coe¢cient of variation of income as their
measure of income inequality. They derive the coe¢cient of variation of income as a function of the
coe¢cient of variation of wealth. Chu, Furukawa, Mallick, Peretto and Wang (2020) show that the
Gini coe¢cient of income has the same expression but as a function of the Gini coe¢cient of wealth.
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and unemployment. Once again, the CIA constraints on consumption and R&D in-
vestment have very di¤erent implications. They nd that in the presence of a CIA
constraint on R&D investment, an increase in ination reduces innovation, which in
turn decreases labor-market tightness and increases unemployment by depressing labor
demand. In contrast, under the CIA constraint on consumption, an increase in ination
decreases unemployment by depressing labor supply and also sties innovation. To see
the di¤erence between the two CIA constraints, we rewrite the resource constraint on
labor as lt = lx;t + lr;t + ut,
12 where ut denotes unemployment which is positive due to
search frictions. Suppose we denote lst  lt as labor supply and l
d
t  lx;t + lr;t as labor
demand. Then, we have
ut = l
s
t   l
d
t > 0, (31)
where lst is decreasing in the ination rate via the CIA constraint on consumption and
ldt is decreasing in the ination rate via the CIA constraint on R&D.
In summary, the CIA constraint on R&D implies a positive relationship between
ination and unemployment, whereas the CIA constraint on consumption implies a
negative relationship between ination and unemployment. Using US data, Chu, Cozzi,
Fan and Furukawa (2020) consider a variable that captures nancial constraints on rms
(a proxy for the CIA constraint on R&D) and another variable that captures nancial
constraints on consumers (a proxy for the CIA constraint on consumption). They nd
that ination has a positive e¤ect on unemployment via the nancial constraint on rms
and a negative e¤ect on unemployment via the nancial constraint on consumers. This
empirical nding is consistent with the above theoretical result.
5 Conclusion
In this survey, we have provided a selective review of the small but growing literature
on ination and innovation-driven growth. In particular, we have used a monetary
Schumpeterian growth model to explore its fruitful implications on how ination af-
fects innovation and economic growth. Recent studies in the literature have extended
the model in di¤erent ways to consider di¤erent general-equilibrium channels which in-
uence the macroeconomic e¤ects of ination. Some recent studies have also extended
the monetary Schumpeterian growth model to analyze monetary policy in an open
economy and the e¤ects of ination on other macroeconomic variables, such as income
inequality and unemployment. In several cases, the CIA constraints on consumption
and R&D investment have very di¤erent implications on the e¤ects of ination.
12Here we simply normalize N to unity.
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